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Artificial Mental Representation and Creative Pursuit
Kuil Schoneveld
B
uilding artificial intelligence capable of cre-
ativity requires that the system hold, ma-
nipulate, and integrate mental representations.
For this to be possible, we must include a no-
tion of intentionality in the artificial intelligence.
The 19th century psychologist Franz Brentano
makes an early distinction between the physical
realm and the object of the mental:this sets the
groundwork for how to interpret the abstract
activity of the mind. The cognitive scientist and
philosopher Daniel Dennett progresses this con-
ception to describe the intentional stance with
which we can interpret a system’s behavior. I
will first situate my discussion of creativity by
referring to Paul Thagard’s philosophical ac-
count of it. In comparison, Margaret Boden’s
more psychological account lays out a hierarchy
of techniques ranging from merely combining
mental concepts together in new ways to ma-
nipulating the conceptual space itself. With
Dennett’s conception of mental structures (such
as beliefs and desires) as entities that exist in
the world, we can better understand Boden’s
description of creative endeavors. Thus, I intend
to argue that mental representation integrations
are possible within artificial systems and that
this strongly implies human degrees of creativity
along Boden’s dimensions. I will briefly discuss
the English mathematician Alan Turing’s vision
for machine cognition and respond to Lovelace’s
objection to it. Following this, I present a vari-
ety of recent works which describe the bridge be-
tween neural structures and mental structures1.
I will integrate this work with Boden’s ideas of
exploration within a conceptual space, as well
as explicate how this type of creativity can be
done artificially. I describe multiple examples of
apparent artificial creativity and offer a modern
version of Lovelace’s objection and an appro-
priate rebuttal. I conclude by overviewing the
progression from intentional mindedness to its
implementation in algorithms, and argue that
similar creative activities conducted by humans
are capable in machines.
To begin discussing creativity, we need a
type of mental entity to manipulate and inter-
pret. To accomplish this, Franz Brentano gives
a seminal account of mental representation: he
postulates that mental phenomena contrast the
physical, because mental phenomena contain in-
tentional objects toward which they are directed
(Brentano, 481). He refers to this characteristic
of mental content being directed at objects as
intentional inexistence (Brentano, 481). Thus,
it follows that our mental concepts and ideas are
acquired through, or based upon, sensory per-
ception. However, it is worth noting that the ob-
jects of the mental are not required to be existent
in the world for them to exist as mental objects.
For example, simply conceiving of Pegasus does
not mean it exists in the world. Though there is
1Much of the work I overview is that of Benedek Papp, David Plaut, and Paul Smolensky (a biotechnologist,
computational psychologist, and computational neuroscientist respectively).
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some controversy surrounding the interpretation
of Brentano2, I will avoid delving into his meta-
physical arguments and instead focus on the
relevant characteristic of minds containing men-
tal content. On this matter, Brentano outrightly
states the importance of mental representations
when he says,“[the] act of presentation forms the
foundation of every mental act” (Brentano, 480).
Thus, to interpret and discuss mental activity,
he is stating that we must consider the mental
entities being held by the mind-havers. This ap-
plies to any mental activity more complex than
an externalized black-box analysis; if we want to
understand the mind, Brentano would argue that
we must assume the mind-haver is experiencing
mental representations. Further, if we realize
that since intentional mental content is directed
at something in the world (though its physical
target is not contingently necessary), we then
know that mental content is about something.
More specifically, the mind can be described as
an intentional system. If we understand the
mind in this way, we begin to develop an ac-
count of mental conception that allows for the
manipulation of mental entities. This leads us
on a path toward understanding creativity and
provides insight on how to replicate it artificially.
If we accept Brentano’s argument that the
mind creates representations, we can now de-
cide how to interpret them. Dennett describes a
sensible means of interpreting these conceptions
through what he calls the intentional stance.
Firstly, Dennett argues that beliefs and desires
are things that exist in the world. Secondly,
he argues that to determine beliefs we must
assume a kind of strategy that makes predic-
tions based on the beliefs: we can then confirm
their existence based on whether the predictions
were accurate (Dennett, 556). Rather than rely
upon any external criteria to determine whether
we hold some belief, he proposes that we could
determine beliefs with a sufficiently nuanced
understanding of the brain states that consti-
tute them (Dennett, 556). Thus, to argue that
mental representations like beliefs are existent
phenomena in the world, Dennett suggests that
the answer lies within the complex patterns of
the brain state that realizes it. To determine
whether some system is a believer, we must now
move to the predictive strategy. If the strategy
adequately predicts a system’s behavior, that
system should be considered a believer.
Following Brentano’s discussion of intention-
ality, Dennett says that we can better under-
stand the behavior of certain systems using the
intentional stance. This can be done relatively
straightforwardly. To begin, we “treat the [sys-
tem] as a rational agent; then figure our what
beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place
in the world and its purpose” (Dennett, 558).
In this way, he abstracts out much of the com-
plexity that adds little to our understanding of
the overall system. In other words, it is un-
necessarily difficult to try learning what food
someone prefers by mapping the interactions and
positions of the particles in the person’s brain.
Rather, we intuitively assume the intentional
stance and verbally ask the person to determine
their beliefs and desires. Dennett argues that
this is especially helpful when considering what
it means to have a mind, the role of the mind
in agency, and what mental phenomena really
are (Dennett, 561). Thus, if we are to under-
stand the apparent patterns in this higher level
of abstraction, it is sensible to assume that the
system being investigated has beliefs, desires,
and other mental conceptions. A similar kind of
detail abstraction resulting in pattern emergence
is present in artificial systems striving to imitate
thought. It is therefore appropriate to attribute
to these systems mental conceptions.
These mental conceptions can then be ma-
nipulated in creative ways: broadly speaking,
when a system integrates and alters mental con-
ceptions to create products that are original3
2Ex. Tim Crane suggests that Brentano did not think any objects of thought exist, while Gabriel Segal instead
claims Brentano posited ‘intentional objects’ to sidestep the problem of thinking about non-existent objects.
3This is deliberately skipping over Boden’s discussion of Psychological vs Historical creativity; all discussion of
originality is in the more objective historical sense.
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and valuable to society, it is exhibiting creativ-
ity. Humans can quickly create new sentences
and lines of inquiry seemingly of our own voli-
tion. This ability is one component of an artifi-
cial superintelligence; a theoretical agent whose
intelligence greatly surpasses that of any human.
For a system to truly seem intelligent, it should
not just answer our questions with the knowl-
edge it has been given, rather it should be able
to create answers that were not hard-coded and
had no direct programmer input. An intelligent
and nuanced system might answer our open-
ended questions with better questions. However,
rather than ask whether we can create this hypo-
thetical system, this essay will focus on whether
artificial systems can exhibit creativity as sepa-
rate from their general superintelligence. With
this context in mind, we can see that creative
potential is necessary for this superintelligence,
though it is not sufficient.
Before we judge the creative potential of a
machine, we first need an account of creativity
within ourselves. We must determine whether
creativity is possible and what specifically con-
stitutes it before any attempts at artificial im-
plementation can be made. Firstly, is ‘pure’
creativity possible? Our logical intuition would
say that no effect can come without a cause,
and thus no creative venture can be entirely un-
prompted. This outlines the foundation of Alan
Turing’s rebuttal to the Lady Lovelace Objec-
tion which will be discussed later in the specific
context of artificial intelligence. First, I will fo-
cus on Paul Thagard’s overview of creativity to
situate it and motivate its artificial implementa-
tion, then I will discuss Margaret Boden’s theory
of creativity as a bridge toward understanding it
as a component of artificially intelligent systems.
Thagard says that creative thinking relies
upon images, which he defines as “mental rep-
resentations based on sensory modalities” (Tha-
gard, 313). He asserts that visual images in
particular are responsible for the advancements
made in many academic fields. If images are
condensed into an understanding of what each
means, they can be juxtaposed and integrated
together to build new images. Concepts are Tha-
gard’s idea of either more abstract, non-verbal
images or images that have been combined to
create a small interacting system. It follows that
different concepts can be combined to create
new ones which induce societal change, similarly
to images but in a less verbally-specific man-
ner. Finally, Thagard offers a description of
rules which are more creatively powerful than
concepts; he argues that rules are the highest
form of human creativity possible. He describes
rules as showing the relationship between mul-
tiple concepts. Rules can portray a complex
interaction between concepts that simply is not
possible within a single concept, let alone a sin-
gle image (Thagard, 318). It is within rules that
Thagard says we find the most socially-altering
creative endeavours. Concepts were the first
step away from the limitations of sensory input
of images, and now rules show us the relations
between these abstracted concepts. Thagard
contrasts the descriptive power of rules with the
normative power of what he calls, methods for
procedural creativity. These methods are usu-
ally a type of rule that attempts to accomplish
some goal by prescribing a series of steps. One
example he gives is an interpretation of Newton’s
calculus; if you want to describe the notion of
‘change’ mathematically, use the calculus (Tha-
gard, 322). We have seen how Thagard describes
creative endeavors as both new ways of describ-
ing the world, and new ways of accomplishing
goals within it. This characteristic of newness
motivates why we should attempt to automate
creative processes. To make advancements and
solve rising problems, we need to think in new
ways and generate new rules.
Margaret Boden offers an account of creative
behavior that has similarities to that of Tha-
gard but is more clearly defined as a hierarchy
of categories. Boden relies upon a similar no-
tion of concepts paralleling Thagard’s. Boden’s
concepts are more abstract versions of images
that allow them to be understood, manipulated,
and integrated together. Similarly, she is relying
upon the metrics of newness, value to society,
and surprise. Thus, she describes all creative
3
endeavor as being a matter of degree; all ideas
may be creative, but that is not to say they
are equally creative (Boden, 2). Two different
creative ideas may be of completely different
form as well as degree. For example, take the
advent of the light bulb and compare it to cu-
bism in painting. It could be said that the light
bulb was a reimagined candlestick, but this loses
much of the value of the idea of the light bulb. It
is the combination of multiple concepts - like the
wire, a carbonized filament to produce light, and
surrounding glass - which resulted in its inven-
tion. Comparatively, the cubism movement was
a general rejection of the traditional portrayals
of perspective: a common theme in cubism is
an attempt to emphasize the two dimensional
nature of the canvas being used. Thus, there is
a significant difference between these two exam-
ples. The first combines previous concepts to-
gether to create a new product, while the other
comments on the very space within which it
is situated. Both types of creativity are anal-
ogous to two of Boden’s categories of creative
thought. The three categories in her hierarchy
are combinational, exploratory, and transforma-
tional creativity (Boden, 3). Each category has a
quaint analogue to action within a child’s sand-
box, which is a common example of a creative
space.
We see that, like Thagard, Boden describes
concepts as the entities to be combined in
creative processes. However, Boden also de-
scribes how these concepts exist within a cre-
ative conceptual space. She asserts that a con-
ceptual space is essentially a “structured style of
thought. . . [or] any disciplined way of thinking
that is familiar to (and valued by) a certain so-
cial group” (Boden, 4). These spaces can differ
across metrics like their creative limit or the re-
lation of the space to other spaces. For example,
compare the games of tic tac toe to chess. Ev-
ery possible move of tic tac toe has been played
because the potential for creativity is severely
limited; there can only be nine moves in a game
at most. While chess has many standard open-
ings that have been played countless times, its
creative cap is far higher than that of tic tac toe,
because after roughly thirty moves, most games
reach a state of originality. We can see some
differences among conceptual spaces and their
analogues in board games. Generally, we are
more interested in designing conceptual spaces
with high potentials for creativity. Their results
are broader in scope, more difficult to predict,
and often more valuable as learning experiences.
It is within these richer conceptual spaces that
we can more clearly differentiate between Bo-
den’s three categories of creativity.
First, combinational creativity involves the
synthesis of new concepts from old ones to create
something of value (Boden, 3). This is arguably
the simplest and least effortful form, since the
agent is only required to find a novel way of
interlocking two concepts with which it is fa-
miliar. For our sandbox example, combinational
creativity might include stacking two differently-
sized bucketful’s on top of one another to create
a two-tiered sandcastle tower. One could make
additions to the sandcastle to further combine
concepts and alter the final product.
Boden defines the second category as ex-
ploratory creativity. She describes this form
such that it appears more fundamental and im-
pactful in its role in the conceptual space be-
cause it involves the discovery of new concepts
themselves. Here, a concept has been created
that is significantly different from all others in
that conceptual space (Boden, 4). Exploratory
creativity can therefore allow for more intricate
combinational creativity. Thus, exploratory cre-
ativity is the causal antecedent because it has
drastic effects on the combinations that are pos-
sible, where the reverse is not necessarily true.
The new concepts may have always been possi-
ble, but they had gone unnoticed until the agent
assumed an exploratory state of mind (Boden,
5). These explorations may not be very adven-
turous, and thus their resultant concepts will
not be significantly different from the ones al-
ready obtained. If we continue with the sandbox
analogy, we can imagine a child who digs in the
sand using their hands to create a moat for their
castle. Instead of just building, the child has
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now begun to dig as a means of creation. Simi-
larly, they may no longer restrict themselves to
using sand and instead make a drawbridge out
of twigs. Thus, they have come up with entirely
new ideas to add to their toolbox of possible
concepts to employ.
Finally, transformational creativity involves
acknowledging the limitations of the conceptual
space itself (Boden, 5). Once acknowledged,
these limitations can be changed, avoided, or
surpassed such that the individual can think
in ways that were impossible while within the
previous conceptual space (Boden, 6). When
the assumptions and limitations of a conceptual
space are realized, they themselves can become
elements to manipulate for the betterment of the
creative product. Transforming the bounds of
one’s conceptual space allows for radical changes
to be made within it: for example, the new men-
tal conceptions of the transformed space might
have been literally impossible to achieve in the
old one because of its limitations. As a result,
if one expands their space, the range of creative
possibilities broadens accordingly. Hence why
transformational creativity is the most funda-
mental category of the three. Like the relation-
ship between exploratory and combinational,
transformational creativity exerts a new degree
of influence upon its dependent categories. It in-
volves the manipulation of the conceptual space
itself, which influences the exploratory cate-
gory. With a changeable space, the concepts
that can be explored and created are also sub-
ject to change. And when there are many new
concepts to discover, the potential combinations
change as a direct result. This chain of uni-
directional dependencies defines the hierarchy
of Boden’s three categories. Returning to our
sandbox analogue, transformational creativity
would involve transcending the bounds of the
sandbox itself: imagine the child removes one of
the four walls of the sandbox to reconceptualize
the entire space as a desert for toy soldiers. In
this case, the previously assumed boundaries of
the sandbox not only limit, but also blind the
agent to any alternative possibilities. Expanding
the sandbox implicitly acknowledges its previous
limitations and allows the new concepts within
to be of a completely different nature.
We have now seen two accounts of creativ-
ity. Thagard’s creativity has acted as a situating
tool which allows us to understand the value of
creativity as a component of our daily practice
and lifelong pursuits. We realize that major cre-
ative junctions form the backbone of progress
throughout history and we have seen his ac-
count of how creativity is achieved to create
social change. Similarly, Boden describes three
categorical tiers of creative thought, each more
fundamental and revolutionary than the last. As
we move from Thagard’s description to Boden’s
more detailed conception, we ask ourselves the
question: “how does this idea of creativity lead
us closer to its artificial implementation?”. For
this, we need even more detail and explicit no-
tation than what Boden offers.
Though Boden argues that her conceptions of
creativity are possible in machine minds, Geraint
Wiggins describes these conceptions with signif-
icantly more detail. He formalizes her cate-
gories as mathematical functions to explicate
their potential for application across domains.
Specifically, Wiggins aims to make a coherent
distinction between exploratory and transfor-
mational creativity as they relate to formalized
conceptual spaces and the objects within them
(Wiggins, 1). To discuss his formalization in
detail would be inappropriate for the scope of
this paper. However, it is worth mentioning that
his attempt to give formal precision to Boden’s
categories helps to translate them into artificial
systems4. Wiggins acknowledges that his work is
only the beginning, but his progress toward such
a specific characterisation sets a strong precedent
for the artificial and systematic formalization of
Boden’s categories. Furthermore, it spawns a
range of new questions to further advance the
4Though Wiggins argues that transformational creativity is a form of exploratory, I continue to use Boden’s three
categories rather than explain the technical distinction since this would require a longer and unnecessary tangential
discussion.
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project of artificially replicating creativity. Wig-
gins also mentions some new problems that his
work has prompted. For example, he describes
the problems of moving toward even more ab-
stract meta-levels of the hierarchy than trans-
formational creativity, or how the interaction of
agents might influence their learning (Wiggins,
8). These questions can only benefit the pro-
gression toward artificially-conceived creativity.
To implement these notions of creativity in
artificial systems, we must first describe how
mental representations can be realised compu-
tationally. Traditionally, computers algorith-
mically operate upon data structures of infor-
mation to accomplish tasks. In this case, the
data structures act as the mental representations
which are processed by their task-specific algo-
rithms. In contrast, more modern approaches
to artificially intelligent systems involve inter-
connected layers of artificial neurons that mirror
the functionality of those in the human brain.
In what follows, I’ll discuss how initial attempts
at machine cognition were hypothesized by Alan
Turing using the data structure and algorithm
method. Then, I’ll show how advancements to-
ward deeply layered neural networks offer more
potential for the artificial creativity endeavour.
Furthermore, I’ll argue that mental representa-
tions in artificial neural nets can be responsible
for the resultant creativity.
It is important that an artificial system is
not simply performing some randomizing func-
tion on the input to create what appears to be a
new output. What is desired is for the machine
to be capable of outputting deliberately-made
creations rather than brute-forcing a thousand
products for a human to only find a select few
which are worthwhile. As such, we hope that the
artificial system uses a methodology that mirrors
a human’s in this important way; by producing a
limited number, but highly creative pieces. The
consideration for the machine’s method is first
recognized in the Lady Lovelace objection to
Alan Turing’s conception of a thinking machine.
Turing believed that for a machine to be
considered intelligent, it must be able to con-
vince a human interpreter that it is also a hu-
man. In his conception of an Imitation Game,
a computer would engage in faceless conver-
sation with two humans (Turing, 434). One
adjudicator attempts to distinguish the human
participant from the machine only through text-
based messages. Turing’s Test implicitly asserts
two things; firstly that thought can be reduced
to computation and secondly that the act of
convincing a human is composed of multiple el-
ements sufficient for affirming the existence of
thought (Turing, 435). If through adequately
elaborate computation the machine can identify
and perform its role in this Imitation Game, we
must admit that it is exhibiting some remarkable
traits. For instance, the computer must be able
to react to certain nuances of language like hu-
mour, sarcasm, or insinuation. If the computer
manages to imitate a human well enough that it
cannot be distinguished from one, Turing says
that we must consider it of comparable intelli-
gence.
Some disagree with this claim because they
think the Turing Test is not truly gauging the
system’s intelligence. When considering creativ-
ity, Lady Lovelace challenges the possibility for
creativity when she says that “a machine can
‘never do anything really new’,” (Turing, 450).
This directly challenges the notion of originality
required for creative ideas. This idea of newness
also permeates Boden’s three categories, though
she only mentions it briefly5. Lovelace, on the
other hand, is arguing that a machine is not
capable of creating something original that de-
viates from simply manipulating its inputs. The
essence of her challenge can be quickly parried in
two ways. First, Turing argues that it would be
difficult to prove a human is capable of original
thought that is entirely independent of inspira-
tion (Turing, 450). Thus, Turing argues that
5Boden says newness is required for creative thought, but she makes no explicit reference to the degree of how new
something must be for it to be a significant. We can piece together a potential answer from the rest of her writing,
but it is worth mentioning that she seems to address newness as a precise binary (and creates H- and P-creativity).
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humans cannot uphold the degree of originality
that Lovelace is demanding of the machine, and
hence he implies that it is unfair to hold the
artificial system to such a standard. Second, it
should be noted that advancements in machine
learning also address this objection in a more lit-
eral sense. By their very nature, machine learn-
ing algorithms are designed to deduce rules and
patterns that were not explicitly coded (Langley
and Simon, 1). These algorithms do often make
errors in their initial pattern deductions. How-
ever, as the algorithm iterates, the initial error
helps to increase the probability that the algo-
rithm ends up identifying a correct pattern (Lan-
gley and Simon, 2). This method of propagating
the error backward through the network is one
such means of supervised learning, where pro-
grammers compare generated outputs with ones
deemed correct (Plaut, 2). Such learning meth-
ods can be applied to many pattern-recognition
problems where the artificial systems outperform
humans and thus surpass the standards Lovelace
might have imagined.
Lady Lovelace’s challenge was directed to-
ward a system vastly different than those used
today. Modern computers are orders of mag-
nitude faster and more complex than Turing
machines, but this fact might not discourage
her point about pure originality. If neither of
the above answers seem adequate in responding
to Lovelace’s objection, we might return to Bo-
den’s three categories of creativity and examine
whether they can be replicated. First, I’ll argue
that mental representation is possible in artifi-
cial systems. More specifically, I’ll show that
low-level implementations of neural structures
can lead to mental structures like those Dennett
describes. Second, I’ll refer to Boden to argue
that these processes of creativity are replicable
in artificial systems. Furthermore, I’ll describe
a modern reconstruction of Lovelace’s argument
and offer a more precise counterargument to
illuminate the future of artificial intelligence de-
velopment in this domain.
As mentioned previously, where Turing ma-
chines may fail, more advanced forms of arti-
ficial intelligence may flourish. This is espe-
cially the case in neural networks, where David
Plaut shows that representations can exist as dis-
tributed entities; encoded by patterns of activity
among many neuron units instead of encoded
within a single unit (Plaut, 1). Furthermore,
he argues that compared to simply scaling up
a Turing Machine, these systems have new and
more accurate ways of modelling the relation-
ship between brain function and their associated
cognitive processes (Plaut, 3). The neurobio-
logical realism of these neural networks means
that the mental representations they create are
more analogous to the mental representations we
humans experience. Moreover, to emphasize the
analogous nature of the duality between the ar-
tificial and biological systems, Benedek Papp et
al. argue that if the structure of an artificial neu-
ron system mirrors that of a biological one, the
cognitive capabilities are also mirrored (Papp et
al., 7). They explicate how mental information
is stored within the weightings of the connec-
tions between neurons (Papp et al., 8). This
aligns with Plaut’s description of distributed
representation and reinforces the similarity be-
tween artificial and biological networks. Thus,
we can see that biologically-inspired artificial
neural networks mimic the mental representa-
tions with which we are familiar. Next, we’ll
briefly see a clearer picture of how neural ac-
tivity manifests into the concepts, beliefs, and
knowledge that guide our action.
Dennett argues that the intentional stance is
far more sensible for predicting an individual’s
beliefs and actions than, say, an astrological
explanation (Dennett, 557). He asserts that in-
tentional beliefs are real patterns of action that
are describable only from the intentional stance
(Dennett, 562). However, Paul Smolensky of-
fers a detailed account of how we can speak
meaningfully as we bridge the gap between neu-
ral activity and mental structures. He posits
a paradigm of abstraction where neural struc-
tures support emergent symbolic layers which
conclude with the mental structures of folk psy-
chology, such as beliefs and desires (Smolensky,
97). He defines this as the symbolic paradigm
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but argues that this linear type of abstraction is
inaccurate. Instead, he describes the more com-
plex sub-symbolic paradigm, which attempts to
formalize the processing which occurs in the ner-
vous system (Smolensky, 99). Where the sym-
bolic paradigm supported each layer directly
upwards from the neural to the mental, the sub-
symbolic has an intermediate connectionist sys-
tem that precedes the approximate higher-level
descriptions. To describe the details of Smolen-
sky’s work would be inappropriate for this pa-
per, but it is worth summarizing by saying that
the sub-symbolic level is intended to highlight
the dynamic nature of the fundamental neural
system. In contrast, the symbolic description
is only the resultant approximation of the sub-
symbolic connectionist system that underlies it.
This inaccuracy is due to the attempt to move
directly from the neural to the symbolic level;
because “connectionist systems are much closer
to neural systems than are symbolic systems”
(Smolensky, 99). Thus, the addition of the sub-
symbolic level enables a higher degree of subtlety
and complexity in understanding mental struc-
tures. It is worth noting that Smolensky defines
connectionist systems similarly to how Plaut and
Papp et al. describe neural networks; knowledge
is encoded in the patterns of weighting strengths
between neurons rather than in symbolic struc-
tures (Smolensky, 95). Thus, we’ve described
the neural-cognitive gap that we must bridge
and seen a few accounts of how to begin this
process. Smolensky explicitly acknowledges the
need for continued work in this area when he
says that “the precise relationship between the
neural and sub-symbolic levels is still an open re-
search question” (Smolensky, 99). Nevertheless,
we now have a clearer conception of how mental
representations can be accurately recreated in
artificial systems.
If we recall Boden’s three categories of cre-
ativity, we can see how our artificial mental
representations can begin to constitute artifi-
cial creativity6. Boden nicely summarizes how
combinational creativity could be achieved using
the two general forms of artificial representation
mentioned earlier; data structures and neural
network/connectionist methods (Boden, 7). It
is important to mention that a system roughly
mashing two representations together does not
necessarily constitute creativity. Instead, the
system must form and evaluate intentional links
between representations that are intelligible.
To make these links thought-provoking or hu-
morous, the artificial system would require “a
database with a richness comparable to ours and
methods of link-making comparable in subtlety
to ours” (Boden, 8). Though this is a difficult
programming task, it is important to notice that
Boden is stating that the issue is one of ability,
not possibility. Thus, we can see that it is pos-
sible to use analogous mental representations in
artificial combinational creativity. Furthermore,
artificial systems can explore a given creative
space by following a certain style and designing
new concepts, such as musical compositions or
architectural blueprints, which fit within certain
parameters that bound the style (Boden, 9).
This can also be extended such that a program
alters its parametrical rules to allow itself more
opportunity for novel creation. One example
of this parametrical rule alteration occurs in ge-
netic algorithms, which generate new rules based
on previously successful ones (Langley and Si-
mon, 2). An algorithm that successfully reaches
its goal is the foundation of the rules of future
generations. (Boden, 9). Returning to neural
networks, Ahmed Elgammal et al. describe how
two networks can be arranged such that they
generate and discriminate creative works of art
(Elgammal et al., 1). In their work, a variant
of generative adversarial networks has been tai-
lored toward exploratory creative pursuit. Their
network generates images that controllably devi-
ate from stylistic norms to increase their stylistic
ambiguity while remaining artful enough for on-
lookers to enjoy as much as human-generated
art (Elgammal et al., 5 & 16). Thus, we see that
both Boden’s description of genetic algorithms
6If we recall and implement Wiggins’ formalizations of Boden’s categories, we can discover more precise examples
of Boden’s implementation of creativity both in human endeavor and in artificial systems.
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and Elgammal et al.’s neural networks can be
used to produce creative results.
Another attempt at artificially-conceived cre-
ativity was met with a modern reconstruction of
Lovelace’s argument. The program designed
for literary creativity, called BRUTUS, can cre-
ate grammatically correct English stories that
contain intrigue and mystery (de Sousa, 642).
However creative its writing may seem, Ronald
de Sousa refutes what he calls the Direct Ar-
gument (put forth by Bringsjord and Ferrucci)
that challenges BRUTUS’ capability for novelty
in its stories. The argument says that machines
are things that implement algorithms and that
nothing can count as creative if it cannot pro-
duce anything new (de Sousa, 645). The argu-
ment dubiously asserts that algorithms produce
nothing new and thus algorithm implementation
is not creativity; by extension, no machine can
be considered creative (de Sousa, 646). This di-
rectly corresponds with Lovelace’s objection to
the notion of a machine being able to originate
anything. De Sousa responds to this expanded
form of the argument by asking why it is assumed
that humans are not implementing (albeit com-
plex) algorithms in our creative endeavors. Fur-
thermore, De Sousa explains that any attempt
to give an example of purely inspiration-free cre-
ativity undermines this argument because the
examples require only a change of perspective
to recognize “that the ‘absurd’ consequences en-
tailed no contradiction” (De Sousa, 646). Thus,
since it seems inherently impossible to identify
the facet of human creativity that cannot be
formalized, we must accept that our artificial
approximations of creativity will eventually be
indistinguishable from the human process7.
As we tread the line between imitating cre-
ativity and truly implementing it, we realize the
boundary begins to blur as the imitation be-
comes more convincing8. In this paper, we’ve
seen how mental representations were initially
described and how they can be seen as pat-
terns of behaviour. Dennett gives an account
of mental conceptions that can be rendered and
understood with the intentional stance. Boden
discusses how these concepts can be integrated
together to constitute creative pursuits of three
kinds. These three categories can be formalized
and realized in different types of artificial sys-
tems. Papp et al., Plaut, and Smolensky have
described how to understand the transition from
low-level neuronal structures to more abstract
mental structures, though this remains an ac-
tive research area. In brief, creative pursuit is
a feat that can be accomplished by artificial
systems. Furthermore, the obstacles we face in
the advancement of these systems are of an epis-
temological nature rather than a conceptual one.
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